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THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS OF THE
WTO: A NORMATIVE STRUCTURE TO ACHIEVE
UTILITARIAN OBJECTIVES
Brian Manning'
Srividhya Ragavan'
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the first dreams of a peaceful world society was outlined in 1795,
by Immanuel Kant in PerpetualPeace: A PhilosophicalSketch.' Kant envisaged
a shift away from what was then the status naturalisof being in a perpetual state
of war, to a future based on cooperation between states. Kant's philosophy laid
the foundation for future internationalism.2 The establishment by the Treaty of
Versailles of the League of Nations in 1919 realized Kant's dream of a foedus
pacificum-a league of peace.'
When the World Trade Organization ("WTO") 4 was established to
regulate trade and reduce trade barriers between its member nations, it seemed
like a natural extension of the philosophy of the League of Nations. Supporters
of the WTO celebrate it as the natural movement of the globe toward cooperation
in trade. Developing nations, however, assert that the WTO is an imbalanced
organization that serves to reassert existing power structures. Lack of adequate
flexibilities to implement the core WTO agreements is cited as exacerbating the
inequality between developed and developing nations. Developing countries
assert that the quest of the WTO to promote trade using the utilitarian philosophy
has resulted in asceticism.5
In examining whether the WTO has achieved its goal of cooperative
international governance, this article posits that the organization has not
efficiently promoted mutually advantageous global relationships. It is the

. Brian Manning, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and do not represent the views or official policy of the Department of State
or the U.S. Government.
. Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center, Norman, Oklahoma; Visiting Faculty,
National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India.
' IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), available at
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kantl.htm (detailing Kant's preliminary articles for
perpetual peace amongst states).
Id.
The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, art. 1, June 28,
1919, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject menus/versailles menu.asp. The treaty is also
known as the Treaty of Versailles.
4 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; see also 4 PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 21:18
(2d ed.) (describing the WTO as "countries that are parties to the Uruguay Round Agreements of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)").
5 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1781),
available at http://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-bentham/index.html (defining asceticism as the
diminution of the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, one of the two principles that
are adverse to the norms of utility).
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authors' contention that the WTO's failure is largely attributable to the structure
and the functioning of the organization's Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). The
normative structure of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") leads to a
strict interpretation of the WTO agreements that does not appropriately account
for members' national realities.6 Also, the DSB's unwillingness or seeming
inability to take quick, thorough action to enforce its decisions where powerful
nations are judged to be at fault has worked a significant hardship on developing
Consequently, the overall goals of the organization have been
states.
compromised to reinforce existing global power structures rather than promote
cooperative governance.
The authors examine two decisions of the DSB-one relating to a
contentious issue concerning agricultural subsidies and another concerning
compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS")'-to assert their position. These studies are preceded
in Part I with an overview of the international trade regime and the TRIPS
agreement in the context of the DSU. Part II analyzes the decisions while Part III
illustrates how they characterize the flaws of the dispute settlement process.
Specifically, Part III demonstrates that the operation of the DSB results in
disadvantaging developing states by: (1) reducing the line between domestic
issues and market access issues; (2) failing to balance the rights and obligations
of members; and (3) allowing powerful nations to avoid WTO rules by simply
not adopting them at the national level, thus preserving bargaining imbalances.
The article concludes with suggestions that can be incorporated into the
settlement process in the future to avoid these undesired outcomes.
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
The developed world holds a distinct advantage over the developing
world in trade and has long sought to sustain this edge. Sustaining the same level
of trade dominance has necessitated creating and capturing new and larger
markets. The creation of new markets has meant opening up existing markets by
removing trade barriers and fostering uniform global protection for the same
subject matter or commodity. The WTO, under which agreements were
negotiated to achieve the objective of reducing trade barriers, faced the
outstanding question of how these agreements would be implemented. The

See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1226, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1197, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 164 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
6
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establishment of an effective enforcement mechanism to ensure enactment and
compliance was conceived as the solution.8
A. The Dispute Settlement Body
The integrated dispute settlement procedure of the WTO borrows its
basic features from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT").9
The WTO incorporated the dispute settlement mechanism outlined in Article
XXIII of the 1994 GATT agreement.'o The judicial nature of the dispute
settlement process of the WTO was touted as strengthening the organization in
Arguably, the enforcement
comparison with the GATT mechanism."
mechanism forces members to strictly implement WTO obligations.12 The
process of settlement of all multilateral disputes arising under the WTO
agreements begins with consultation to enable a mutually acceptable solution. "
If the consultation fails, the dispute is arbitrated before a panel of three to five

Previously, Paris Convention disputes were settled by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"),
whose jurisdiction depended on consent of States. Such a system, of course, caused difficulties in
enforcing the judgments. See generally Nicole Telecki, The Role of Special 301 in the
Development of InternationalProtectionof Intellectual PropertyRights After the Uruguay Round,
14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 187, 191 (1996); see also Robert Pechman, Seeking MultilateralProtectionfor
Intellectual Property: The United States "TRIPS" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
179, 181-82 (1998) (detailing some members' choice not to recognize the ICJ's jurisdiction-even
members recognizing the ICJ tended to ignore unfavorable rulings). Hence, the WTO system
established a dispute settlement mechanism with enforcement powers.
9 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 33 I.L.M. 1154, reprintedin THE
8

LEGAL TEXTS: TiE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; see also TRIPS art. 63-64; Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager,
Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 391, 411-13 (1996).

10Carrie P. Smith, Comment, PatentingLife: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to
Globalize Intellectual PropertyRights, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 143, 157 (2000).
" Otten & Wager, supra note 9, at 411-12. For example, under GATT, settled disputes required
the consent of both parties. Generally, the losing party either delayed or withheld consent. The
panel reports and decisions of the DSB will be considered adopted unless there is a consensus
against their adoption.
J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the
TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995) (discussing how, taken
together, the enforcement and dispute-settlement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement put teeth into
the pre-existing intellectual property conventions). See also Myles Getlan, TRIPS and the Future
of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
173, 211 (1995) (arguing that the U.S. should abandon the use of section 301 against GATT
members, as use of the dispute resolution mechanism in TRIPS for resolving an IP dispute is more
likely to yield similar results with greater benefits).
1 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M, 1125, 1226, 1244, reprintedin THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, [hereinafter The Understanding]. The

"Dispute Prevention and Settlement" provisions relate to preventing and settling IP disputes arising
from trade.
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experts. 14 The General Council, which consists of all WTO members, acts as the
DSB.'s The DSB has the sole authority to establish panels of experts to evaluate
disputes and to accept or reject the findings of the panels or the appellate body.' 6
Generally, the panel's findings, unless unanimously rejected, are adopted by the
DSB except where either party chooses to appeal the opinion.'7 Appeals from
the panel's decisions are heard by an appellate body whose findings, once
adopted by the DSB, are final.' 8
Within thirty days of the formal adoption of the report, the breaching
party must inform the DSB of its compliance plan. 9 Where compliance is not
forthcoming, the non-breaching party can request for the matter to be addressed
by a compliance panel. 20 Additionally, after the expiry of the "reasonable time"
for compliance, the non-breaching party gains the right to retaliate in the form of
suspended concessions against the non-complying party.2 1 The DSB itself is
authorized to take action against a non-complying party.22 Notwithstanding
cause, the DSB can authorize "appropriate measure[s]" in retaliation against a
non-complying member if they abuse intellectual property ("IP"), 23 restrain
international trade,24 or affect international transfer of technology.2 5 Thus, the
DSB can require the non-complying state to compensate (say, by mandating trade
concessions) the damaged party, or it can unilaterally permit the complaining
state to retaliate by suspending concessions it had previously granted to the
offending nation.26 The DSB regularly monitors the implementation of the
rulings.
There are several shortcomings inherent in the DSB process. For
instance, the DSB's powers are limited, at least in theory, to addressing issues
affecting international trade, and do not extend to those that are primarily
national in nature. In practice, however, the DSB has addressed issues that are
essentially of national interest. One such example is a dispute between India and
the United States, which centered on determining the national legal status of

14 Id. Article 6 of the Understanding provides for the establishment of a panel at the instance of the
complaining party.
1s See World Trade Organization, TRIPS: A More Detailed Overview of the TRIPS Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_eftrips-e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Jun. 17, 2010).
16

id.

Otten & Wager, supra note 9, at 411-13. See also Smith, supra note 10, at 167.
18Otten & Wager, supra note 9, at 411-13.
'9 DSU art. 21.3.
20
DSU art. 21.5.
21 DSU art.
22.2.
22 DSU art. 22.3.
23 See TRIPS art. 8(2).
'7

24 id.
25 id.
26 id.
27

See generally TRIPS: A More Detailed Overview of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15.
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India's Presidential Ordinance.28 Similarly, even where its decisions have a
propensity to affect national questions, the DSB is not required to take stock of
local social and economic conditions. Consequently, the DSB process is
divorced from local socio-political realities faced by governments, which are
significant in implementing the decision. 29 Also, while parties can seek countermeasures for non-compliance, what specifically constitutes compliance remains
unclear.30
Another significant flaw in the DSB mechanism is that it deals with
disputes on an unrealistic assumption that all parties are equal. The DSB
mechanism creates juridical equality between economically unequal parties.
Such treatment by the DSB mechanism particularly disadvantages poorer nations.
In theory, the power imbalance between developed and developing nations is
recognized by Article 27(2) of the DSU, which provides for special legal
Similarly, Article 24 of the DSU, which
assistance for developing nations.
dispute settlement procedures against the
from
using
urges members to refrain
least developed countries, is showcased as recognizing the power imbalance.
But, even those who are not entirely in opposition to the DSB system recognize
that the power imbalance, in practice, skews the system in favor the developed
countries and to the detriment of developing members.32
III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT-CASE STUDIES
The following section outlines case studies which are representative of
the problems caused by the current operation of the dispute settlement
mechanism.

See discussion infra Part III, Case Study I (discussing the mailbox dispute). See generally David
Tomar, A Look Into the WTO PharmaceuticalPatent Dispute Between the UnitedStates and India,
17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 579 (1999) (discussing India's resistance to amending patent legislation). See
also Nadia Natasha Seeratan, The Negative Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on
Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian PharmaceuticalIndustry, 3 SCHOLAR 339
(2001).
29 18 STUDIES INTRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: 19952003, 422-23 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004).
30
MITsuO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW PRACTICE AND POLICY 30
(2006).
28

31DSU art. 27.2.

Smith, supra note 10, at 168 ("Proponents of the DSU mechanism argue that the model balances
out the power differential between nations. For example, the monitoring process prevents
developed countries from unilaterally imposing sanctions against developing nations for alleged
violations of the TRIPS Agreement. The DSU is designed to limit the possibility of bullying
maneuvers by developed nations, while enabling countries dependent upon trade with those
wealthier nations to assert their rights under the agreement.").
32
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A. Case Study 1: India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products
1. Background
The developed world holds a distinct advantage over the developing
world in the field of intellectual property. Through carefully crafted national IP
laws, developed nations protect innovations from being copied. The stark boost
in international trade and the globalization of the broad economic market,
though, necessitated globally harmonized protection regimes." Thus, developed
nations sought to establish an international system to strengthen the protection of
IP rights.34
Two early attempts to establish international IP rights, the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention), were largely unsuccessful. 3s These initial failures led developed
states to push for stronger IP protection at the WTO. The movement to create a
new multinational IP system that would afford both minimum standards of
protection and effective enforcement procedures was spearheaded by developed
nations who had strong economic incentives. They were especially interested
in bolstering patent protection, as the top ten industrialized nations hold around
ninety-four percent of all patents and account for about eighty-five percent of all
capital exhausted on research and development. Leaders of the charge included
the U.S., which in 1989 exported around sixty billion dollars in services and
goods of an IP nature38 and whose special interest lobby groups launched a
massive campaign calling for a new agreement, the European Community, and
Japan. 4 0 After lobbying for years, the developed countries finally saw IP rights
emerge as a main issue at the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1994.41

3 See Evelyn Su, The Winners and Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 169, 216
(2000). See also PETER NANYENYA-TAKIRAMBUDDE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 60, 61-63 (1980).
34 See Su, supra note 33, at 185.
3 See Pechman, supra note 8, at 180-81.
36 See Nabila Ansari, InternationalPatentRights in a Post-Doha World, 11 WTR CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 57, 59 (2002). See also Pechman, supranote 8, at 183.
3 See Ansari, supra note 36, at 57.
38 THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE
POLICY 191 (1994).
3 Id.; see also Susan K. Sell, Post-Trips Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and
Social Agendas in The Context ofIntellectualProperty, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (2002).
4 Su, supra note 33, at 185.
41 L. Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries
After the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 129, 134 (2003).
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TRIPS, adopted in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994, was one of
several agreements reached under the Uruguay Round.42 The Agreement
currently boasts 153 members (every member of the WTO is also a member of
TRIPS), and its purpose is to provide effective and adequate protection of IP
rights so as to encourage global competition and to reduce barriers to
international trade. 43 Developing countries, however, remained reluctant to
match the developed country standards relating to patents. Owing to local
economic conditions, these nations preferred to prioritize other worthy objectives
such as the elimination of poverty and unemployment. Developing nations
associated patent protection with higher prices for pharmaceuticals and
considered it an infeasible proposition in the light of public health issues.
Developed nations, however, argued that the differences in IP treatment between
the rich and the poor countries gave rise to significant trade distortions, and
refused to accept the co-relation between level of economic development and
patent protection.45
Meanwhile, India, a country that had managed to provide access to
medication for a majority of its poor population by promoting a generic drug
industry, attracted significant attention from pharmaceutical patent owners. In
1994, when India became a signatory, TRIPS embodied a transitional perioduntil January 1, 2005-for members to move toward the product patent regime.46
In exchange for the grace period within which developing countries had to
become fully compliant with respect to the TRIPS patent regulations, Article
70.8 of the agreement required members to establish a "mailbox" mechanism
during the transition. The mechanism required members to establish a means to
file patent applications in areas that would become eligible for protection only
after the transition.4 7 The mailbox mechanism was the means by which countries
in transition-largely developing countries-were to accept patent applications
and assign them priority for the purpose of determining patent eligibility after the
transition.48 By virtue of Article 70.9, members were required to provide
exclusive marketing rights ("EMR") to patent applications in the mailbox. A
patent application filed with a transitioning member would enjoy EMR provided
two conditions were met: first, an application was filed in another member state,
and second, the application matured into an actual patent.4 9

See supra note 7.
43 Id.
" See World Health Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha-declaration/en/index.html (last visited Aug. 8,
2010) (discussing how the concerns of developing countries on the effect of patents on public
health resulted in the Doha Declaration).
45 See Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22
N. Ky. L. REv. 579,618 (1995).
4 TRIPS art. 65.
42

47
48

TRIPS art. 70.8.

49

TRIPS art. 70.9.

TRIPS art. 70.8.
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After India became a TRIPS signatory, the President of India
promulgated the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994,o which provided for
accepting mailbox applications in the area of agricultural and chemical product
The Ordinance detailed application procedures, scope, and
inventions.
enforcement of rights of EMR.5 ' However, a decision as to actual patentability
would not be made until India's proposed transition on January 1, 2005.52 The
Ordinance of January 1, 1995 effectively amended the Indian Patents Act, 1970,
bringing the nation into compliance with TRIPS Articles 70.8 and 70.9.5
The 1994 Ordinance, though, lapsed on March 16, 1995, per the Indian
Constitution, when Parliament failed to address the matter within six weeks of
reconvening.5 4 In an attempt to permanently implement the contents of the failed
Ordinance, the Lower House of Parliament (the Lok Sabha) passed the Patents
(Amendment) Bill in March 1995." But, while a Select Committee of the Upper
House (the Rajya Sabha) was still examining the bill, the Upper House of
Parliament dissolved on May 10, 1995, causing the bill to lapse. 6
The Patents Bill lapsed in large part due to the sensitivity of the subject
within India, considering its impact on the cost of medication. Compliance with
Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of TRIPS was expected to hurt local pharmaceutical
producers and diminish the government's ability to ensure low costs for essential
medicines. 7 The burdens from increased administrative costs associated with
implementing the necessary TRIPS programs also contributed to the skepticism.
The government recognized the need to keep pharmaceuticals affordable 5 8-the
elected representatives felt the pressure from their electorates to keep medical
supplies accessible to the poor at low prices. 59 Political pressure abounded to
prioritize affordability of pharmaceuticals for India's 320 million people who
lived below the poverty line as of 1993 .6o TRIPS lacked the flexibility to achieve

See The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, Ord. No. 7 of 2004; INDIA CODE (2004), available at
http://lawmin.nic.in/Patents%20Amendment%200rdinance%202004.pdf [hereinafter Amendment];
see generally INDIA CONST. art. 123 § I (authorizing the President to legislate when parliament is
not in session and the President deems it necessary to take immediate action).
s' Amendment, supra note 50.
52 See Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical
Products, 2.3, WTIDS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Patent Protection Panel Report].
53 See Seeratan, supra note 28, at 339.
54 See Patent Protection Panel Report, supra note 52, at 2.5; see also Shishir Mehta & Rajesh
Chavada, The Mailbox Dispute and Implications on Indian Patent Regime, THE STUDENT
ADVOCATE 40,1 7 (1998).
ss See Patent Protection Panel Report, supranote 52, at 2.5.
50

56 Id.
57

See Posting of James Love, http://lists.essential.org/pipermaillip-health/2005-March/007652.html
(Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Love].
ss See Tomar, supra note 28, at 581.
$9 Id.
6 See Happy Anniversary?, THE ECONOMIST (SPECIAL ISSUE), Aug. 16, 1997, at 20.
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such an objective. Further, the Indian electorate reasonably feared the loss of
pharmaceutical independence that India had enjoyed.
The lapsing of the Patents Bill caused the United States, in May of 1996,
to its watch-list of countries that did not provide adequate IP patent
India
to add
62
protection. Notably, the U.S. had already revoked duty-free treatment under the
WTO's Generalized System of Preferences, which resulted in a levy of sixty
million dollars, after citing India's failure to protect U.S. patents on drugs.
India was concerned that the ordeal would lead to formal investigations and
feared the imposition of trade sanctions on its exports.
Fearing trade sanctions and intending to avoid a lengthy, expensive battle
at the WTO, India's government executives attempted to meet the country's
TRIPS obligations by issuing administrative orders. 4 The administrative orders
instructed the Patent Office to receive patent applications for pharmaceutical,
agricultural, and chemical products.6 ' A decision on whether to grant EMR
would not be made until the applicant actually sought such rights and the issue of
patentability would be deferred until the end of the transition period, on January
1, 2005.66 From January 1, 1995 to February 15, 1997, India received and stored
1,339 applications under the administrative scheme.67 As of late September
1997, no applicant had requested an EMR.
In July 1996 the United States requested consultations with India
pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU, read with Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement,
claiming that India was in breach of its TRIPS obligations for not statutorily
offering the mailbox mechanism. 6 9 When consultations failed, the U.S. requested
that a dispute panel be established to review the claim. 70

61 See

Srividhya Ragavan, Can't We All Get Along-The Case For a Workable Patent Model, 35
AIUZ. ST. L. J. 117 (2003) (discussing perspectives on the Indian patent amendment).
62 See U.S. Opens Investigation into Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in India, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1117 (July 10, 1996); see also Mehta & Chavda, supra note 54, 11
(discussing the U.S. request for a panel to take up the dispute with India on November 7, 1996). A
Fanel was constituted under the procedures of the WTO on November 20, 1996. Id.
George K. Foster, OpposingForces in a Revolution in InternationalPatentProtection: The U.S.
and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 283, 319 (1998)
(detailing that in the May 1996 elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") won 162 seats while
the Congress (1) won 140 seats. This election resulted in India being governed by a coalition
government consisting of the United Front (coalition of regional parties) and Congress (1)). Id. at
317. The U.S. was "extending preferential tariff treatment under the GATT Generalized System of
Preferences ("GSP") ... [and] revoked duty-free treatment under the GSP for India's exports of
pharmaceuticals, citing India's poor protection of U.S. patented drugs ... result[ing] in a levy of
$60 million[,J" thus reducing Indian exports). Id.
6 Id.; see generally Pechman, supra note 8, at 196 (discussing how the U.S. subjected countries
with inadequate protection of IP rights to special 301 trade sanctions).
65 See Patent Protection Panel Report, supra note 52, at 2.5.
6 Id. at 7.3.
67 Id. at 7.4.
61 Id. at 7.5.
69 Id. at 1.1.
70 Id.
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2. Panel's Findings
The panel's findings of September 5, 1997, examined both substantive as
well as procedural issues. " First, the panel analyzed Article 70.8 under a
context, object, and purpose-based interpretation.7 2 The panel noted that the
Article required members to establish a means to facilitate the filing of mailbox
applications and provide a sound legal basis to preserve the application's novelty
and priority.7 The panel determined that India violated Article 70.8 in not
establishing a statutory means to establish such a mailbox mechanism. 74
Additionally, the panel found that India was in breach of Article 70.9 for not
having in place a statutory mechanism to grant EMR.
3. Appellate Body Findings
As to the question of
India appealed the panel's decision.7 6
interpretation, the appellate body ("AB") determined that TRIPS shall be
interpreted in "good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose,"7 7
based on the directive in GATT acquis and Article 31 of the Vienna
In doing so, the AB utilized a different spectrum for examining
Convention.
the article and reversed the Panel's standard of context, object, and purposebased examination of the individual article (i.e., Article 70.8) in question.
Despite using the Vienna Convention's terms to interpret the text, the
AB's preferred method of interpretation was on the basis of the legitimate
expectations of the parties at the time of signing the treaty (and opposed to an
objective-based interpretation of the treaty as required in the Vienna
Convention), as detailed below80:
The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the
language of the treaty itself. The duty of a treaty interpreter is to

71 id.
72 id.

73
74 Id.
1d. at

8.1.

75 Id.

See Notification of an Appeal, India-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural
ChemicalProducts, WTIDS5O/6 (Oct. 16, 1997).
n Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679 (emphasis added).
7 Id.; see generally James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarationon TRIPS and
Public Health under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 291
(2002).
7 See Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, 36, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Patent Protection Appellate
Body Report].
so Id. 55.
76

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS OF THE WTO

2010]

11I

examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the
parties. This should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty
interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. But these
principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation
into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty
of concepts that were not intended.
Arguably, the AB misinterpreted the spirit (not the text) of the Vienna
Convention and set a new standard for interpreting international agreements.
Traditionally, international agreements are not interpreted like statutes, which
tend to be construed more strictly to give deference to the views of the
legislature. International agreements are not enforcement mechanisms, but
instruments that merely memorialize collective sovereign intentions. The
intentions of parties with respect to the international agreements and obligations
are generally amenable to local needs, politics, and economic situations, and
hence, a more flexible and broader construction is warranted. The Vienna
Convention lends an objective-based reading precisely for the reason of
The appellate body's interpretation, in stark
accommodating flexibility.
contradiction of this principle, takes away the flexibility of member states.
Unfortunately for India, the strict-constructionist, textualist, and nontraditionalist approach would color the appellate body's treatment of the
substantive issues in contention.
Had the appellate body followed a more traditional course of
interpretation, it would have examined TRIPS in the light of the goals and
objectives espoused in Article 7 and the preamble's deference to developing
states on account of prevailing economic conditions. Instead, the appellate body
strictly construed Article 70.882 and held that India had an obligation to establish
a legally sound mailbox mechanism. 83
Having determined the requirements under Article 70.8, the AB
proceeded to examine whether India's administrative orders in fact established a
legally sound mailbox mechanism. India objected that the AB was unqualified to
determine the soundness of a local implementation mechanism on the grounds
that Article 1.1 of TRIPS preserved the sovereign right of members to determine
India's
the method and mechanism of implementing TRIPS obligations.8
implementation
of
legal
choice
the
with
interfere
cannot
DSB
that
the
argument
tools chosen by a nation was rejected by the AB, which found that the
"administrative instructions" of India contradicted the provisions of the Indian
Patents Act 1970, and hence the assigned priority dates were legally untenable.86

8

Id. 145.

82

Id. 56.
Id. 58.
M Id. 59.
8

id. 166.
Id. 170.

8 6 See
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That is, India's administrative instructions required the Controller to provide
priority dates but defer examinations of mailbox applications until patent
But Section 15(2) of the Patents Act 1970
amendments were executed.
mandated that the examiner refuse applications for non-patentable inventions.
The AB felt that examiners would be obligated by the statute to reject all
applications for protecting pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.
The AB was thus not convinced that administrative orders would survive a legal
challenge under the Indian Patents statute. 90 The appellate body rejected India's
position that the scheme was legitimate under the jurisprudence developed by the
Indian courts.9 ' Instead, like the panel, 92 the AB required precedents explicitly
showing that a court will uphold the validity of administrative actions where they
arguably contradict legislation.93 Thus, the AB refused to defer to a nation's
interpretation of its own legislation and held that India violated Article 70.8.
Similarly, applying a line of analysis that treated Article 70.9 as
operating in tandem with Article 70.8, the AB held that India violated Article
70.9 by not establishing a system for granting EMR after the lapse of the
President's Ordinance. 94 India's argument that a violation of the Article does not
occur until an applicant makes an actual demand on the government of India for a
grant of an EMR was rejected. 95 The appellate body report of December 19,
1997, which concluded that India had a legally unsound mailbox mechanism, was
adopted by the DSB in January 1998. 96 Following the report, India agreed to act
on the recommendations to comply with TRIPS by April 19, 1999.9'

"Id.

169.

88 Id.

9 Id.
Id. $ 70.
9 India offered case laws in support of its assertion. India cited the two Supreme Court cases to
confirm the Indian position that its reliance on an administrative practice regarding the handling of
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product patent applications is not unconstitutional, see
State of Haryana v. Mahendra Singh & Others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1681. See also Union of India v.
H.R. Patankar & Ors. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1587 (holding that statutory rules cannot be amended by
Executive instructions but "if the rules are silent" on any particular point, the Government can fill
up the gaps by issuing executive instructions, in conformity with the existing rules). See generally
INDIA CONST. art. 73 § 1.
92 See Patent Protection Panel Report, supra note 52, at 7.37.
93 Id.
94 Article 70.9 and Article 70.8 "operate in tandem to provide a package of rights and obligations
that apply during the transitional periods contemplated in Article 65. It is obvious, therefore, that
both Article 70.8(a) and Article 70.9 are intended to apply as from the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement." Patent Protection Appellate Body Report, supra note 79, 81.
9 See Patent Protection Appellate Body Report, supranote 79, $ 97.
96 See Dispute Settlement Appellate Body Report, India-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland
AgriculturalChemical Products,WT/DS50/9 (Jan. 27, 1998). See also Patent Protection Appellate
Body Report, supra note 79.
9 Tomar, supra note 28, at 590.
90
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Consequently, the Indian Parliament passed the Patents (Amendment) Act of
1999.9

B. United States-Upland Cotton
1. Background
As mentioned in the previous section, the agreements of the WTO
represent the end-product of different compromises made by member nations.
The compromise of the developing countries in embracing IP protection by
becoming a TRIPS signatory was the developed world's promise to reduce tariffs
on agriculture and textiles. Agricultural support, like intellectual property, has
long been a highly contentious issue in world trade. But unlike intellectual
property, where developing nations are accused of creating trade barriers by
providing inadequate protection, in the case of agricultural trade, developed
nations stand accused of creating trade barriers by providing agricultural support.
Developing nations have long asserted that distortions in agricultural trade owing
to the agricultural support enjoyed by farmers in developed nations forms a major
portion of the distortion paradigm affecting their counterparts in poorer nations. 99
Thus, of the WTO obligations, reducing barriers to agricultural trade by
addressing national agricultural support programs is unique in requiring
substantial efforts from the developed world.
"Agricultural support" essentially refers to different forms of subsidies
that a government pays to its farmers to protect them from market forces.
Subsidies tend to be fashioned in the lines of government support programs,
typically extended by national governments, and are designed to cushion local
farmers from market risks. Subsidies affect international trade by artificially
altering the price of subsidized commodities in the global market.
In order to reduce the trade distortions from subsidies, two significant
agreements were adopted at the Uruguay Round to restrict agricultural
subsidies.' 00 The first, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(hereinafter SCM Agreement),'o' applies to subsidies in every economic sector
and forbids export subsidies, as well as any other subsidy that is proven to be

9 See Status Report by India, Addendum, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/10/Add.4 WT/DS79/6 (Apr. 15, 1999). See also The
Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1999; INDIA CODE (1999).
9 See Srividhya Ragavan, To Sow or Not To Sow: Dilemmas in Creating Rights in Food, in
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEDS OF CHANGE 320, 336-37 (J.
Kesan ed., 2007).,
1a See Matthew C. Porterfield, US. Farm Subsidies and Expiration ofthe WTO's Peace Clause,27
U.PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1002, 1005 (2006).
1o1Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, reprintedin THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 164 (1994)
[hereinafter SCM Agreement] .
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trade-distorting.102 It defines the constituents of a subsidy, regulates the use of
these subsidies, and recommends policy responses to nations affected by other
countries' subsidies.1 03 Additionally, the agreement focuses on countervailing
duties, which are duties imposed on imports to offset the advantage that
producers from subsidy-offering countries enjoy.'
The second most important agriculture-related agreement, the Agreement
on Agriculture, in line with the broad objective of the WTO, aims at "substantial
progressive reduction" of farm subsidies that distort trade. 05 The agreement
designates several obligations in areas like domestic support, market access,
safeguards, and export subsidies.' 06 One provision, the Peace Clause,107 allowed
states to continue using certain agricultural subsidies despite their trade-distorting
effect (which member states would otherwise be able to challenge under the
SCM Agreement), for nine years from the inception of the Agreement on
Agriculture.'0o
Subsidy negotiations continue to remain at the heart of the WTO agenda
for various reasons. Some of the most vehement subsidies disputes have
revolved around cotton. Criticisms emanating from the developing world include
developed nations' insistence on subsidizing the local cotton industry while
demanding that other states open up their markets. Being the largest exporter of
cotton in the world, the United States makes up a quarter of the global cotton
trade. 0 9 Cash receipts attributable to cotton production by the U.S. have
averaged around $4.7 billion per year over recent years.1 10 Every year 8.2 billion
pounds are harvested, processed, and then handled in the U.S., making for a retail

See Porterfield,supra note 100, at 1005-06.
See MATSUSHITA, supra note 30, at 262-63.
'" Id. at 296.
1os Agreement on Agriculture, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 43 (1999) [hereinafter Agreement
on Agriculture].
" Id. Preamble.
107 Id. art. 13.
1os See Porterfield, supra note 100, at 1006. The Peace Clause expired on December 31, 2003.
With that, the subsidies of all nations become actionable under the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. In effect, taking into account other considerations like the level of
subsidies and its effect on the affected nation, etc., the expiry of the Peace Clause creates
opportunities for the developing states to challenge the large agricultural subsidies doled out in the
United States and Europe. For more on the Peace Clause and the effects of its expiration, see Third
World
Network, The
Peace
Clause in
the WTO's
Agriculture
Agreement,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twninfo84.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2010); see also K.
Subramanian, Life in WTO after the Peace Clause, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE, June 11, 2004,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.comi/2004/06/1l/stories/2004061100081100.htm.
10 Nora L. Brooks, Characteristicsand Production Costs of U.S. Cotton Farms, Economic
at
(2001)
available
USDA,
2
SB9742
Service,
Research
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/sb974-2/sb974-2.pdf.
110
See
Cotton
Counts,
NAT'L
COTTON
WOMENS'
CoMM.,
available at
http://www.cotton.org/pubs/cottoncounts/upload/Cotton-Counts.pdf.
102
103
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value of near $120 billion per year."' Upward of forty percent of raw American
cotton is scheduled to be exported.1 2 Despite its longstanding stranglehold on
the industry, the labor costs in the U.S.-key in an industry that remains labor
intensive despite advances in technology-has resulted in a framework of
subsidy support for cotton farmers. 113 Estimates indicate that American cotton
subsidies depress the average global cotton price by at least ten percent.114
The dispute relating to upland cotton began in September of 2002 when
Brazil requested consultations with the United States to seek relief from damage
it alleged was caused to its upland cotton industry by the U.S. Farm Bill of 2002
and by U.S. commodity programs from 1999 to 2002.15 When the consultations
failed, in February of 2003, Brazil requested that a DSB panel be constituted to
resolve the dispute." 6
2. Panel and Appellate Body Report
The panel and appellate body considered five distinct claims made by
Brazil with regard to the U.S. programs.'1 7 The panel ruled overwhelmingly in
Brazil's favor on almost every issue, with the appellate body upholding the ruling
on appeal." 8 Significantly, both ruled that domestic support subsidies provided
by the U.S. to upland cotton producers from 1999 to 2002 violated the SCM
Agreement, and were not protected under the Agreement on Agriculture's Peace
Clause due to the fact that the level of support in those years was higher than the
agreed levels of 1992."' In addition, the panel held, and the appellate body
affirmed, that four separate price-contingent cotton subsidy programs led to
significant price suppression in the global upland cotton market, thereby
violating the SCM Agreement.120 The largess of the subsidies' 2 1 and the

11 Id.
112See Brooks, supra note 109, at 2.
" Id. at 5.
" See THE WTO, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

AND THE DOHA AGENDA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

FOR TRADE-LED GROWTH 17-18 (Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis ed., 2004).

See also Michael J.

Shumaker, Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade Organization: United States--Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, 32 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 547, 580 (2007).
1s See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States--Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/1 (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by Brazil].
116
Dispute Settlement: DS 267, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu-e/casese/ds267_e.htm (last visited June 12, 2010)
Dispute Settlement: DS 267].
[hereinafter
17
Id
us8 Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, S 763, WT/DS267/AB/R
(Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report].
"9 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, T 447, WT/DS267/R
(Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Upland Cotton Panel Report]; See also Upland Cotton Appellate Body
Report, supra note 118, 763(b)(ii).
120 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 118,
94 (discussing how the four pricecontingent subsidy programs-marketing loan program payments, counter-cyclical payments,
market-loss assistance payments and Step 2 payments-were illegal).
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subsidies' effect on global upland cotton pricesl 22 led to a finding of serious
prejudice. The appellate body report, adopted in March 2005, required the U.S.
to withdraw its illegal support programs extended to cotton exporters and
domestic cotton producers by July 1, 2005.123 Further, the AB required the U.S.
to make statutory and regulatory amendments remedying the serious prejudice
caused by subsidies that prevailed between 1999 and 2002.124 The AB
recommended that the U.S. cut or at least curtail its price-driven "amber box"
subsidy payments.1 25 Significant changes by the U.S. would not be forthcoming
because, despite the DSB ruling, Congressional approval could not be secured.
Brazil would be proved reasonable in its fear that the U.S. would be slow to
initiate change, despite the assurance of compliance to the DSB.1 26
3. Upland Cotton: Non-compliance by the U.S.
The developed world wanted a dispute settlement system that would
force members to act on a DSB ruling that a national law or program is
inconsistent with a WTO agreement in order to avoid trade sanctions. But a chief
supporter of that system, the U.S. Congress, has been loath to effect the
amendments called for by the DSB.' 27 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA"), adopted in 1994 by Congress to implement the WTO, required prior
congressional action to effect compliance: "[N]o provision of the Uruguay Round
Agreements ... that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have
effect ....

28

Further, no part of the URAA "shall be construed . . . to amend or
modify any law of the United States . .. or ... to limit any authority conferred
under any law of the United States . . . unless specifically provided for in this

act."' 29

In an attempt to become at least partially compliant, in July 2005, the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture proposed statutory reforms for Congress that would
have repealed an illegal cotton subsidy program, end an Intermediate Export
Credit Guarantee Program, and change the Department of Agriculture's fee
121 Upland

Cotton Panel Report, supra note 119, 1 448(iv).
3.2.
123 Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 119, $ 8.3
and $7.150.
24
1 Id. T 449.
25
1 Id. 173.
126 See Dispute Settlement: DS 267, supra note 116.
27 See H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt.1, at 25 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3791-92
(discussing the Committee hearings held on June 10, 1994 on the World Trade Organization and its
implications for U.S. sovereignty); See also H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), reprintedin 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013 (discussing the Bill for the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. 5110, 103rd
Cong. (1994)); See also The President's Statement of Administrative Actions, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040. See Charles Tiefer, The GA7TAgreement on Government Procurement Theory
andPractice,26 U. BALT. L. REv. 31, 38-39 (1997).
12819 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000).
129Id. § 3512 (a)(2).
122 Id.
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structure for certain credit programs.13 0 Some of the proposals were adopted as
part of the U.S. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which came into effect in
February 2006.'1 Though the legislation did eliminate subsidies that were per se
prohibited by the appellate body (e.g., U.S. Step-2 Cotton Program), the new law
did not address the issue of comprehensive aggregate commodity support, which
the appellate body report had raised but had failed to explicitly or decisively state
how the U.S. could comply effectively. 3 2 The unresolved issue centered around
what exactly the WTO would classify as actionable amber box subsidies.' 33 The
U.S. agriculture community decried the DSB ruling as flawed and vague.13 4
The lack of proper implementation of the ruling frustrated Brazil and
countries, especially the least-developed cotton-producing
developing
other
African states.' Brazil formally requested (twice) that the matter be returned to
the Panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU to consider retaliatory measures for noncompliance.136 Brazil claimed around four billion dollars in damages and sought
permission to take retaliatory measures. 137 In September 2006, the original panel
of the DSB considered whether the U.S. had sufficiently complied.'
4. The Second Panel Finding
The much delayed report of the panel, circulated in December 2007,
found that the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments provided to U.S.
upland cotton producers, pursuant to the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act
of 2002, resulted in price suppression in the world market for upland cotton
within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.139 The payments
under the enactment seriously prejudiced Brazilian interests under Article 5(c) of
the SCM Agreement.140 The United States, in not taking steps to rectify the
adverse effects of the subsidy program, failed to comply with its obligation under
Further, the panel held that export
Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement.14'

Press Release, U.S. Department of Agriculture Proposes Legislative Changes to Cotton and
Export Credit Programs to Comply with WTO Findings (July 5, 2005), available at http://
www.usda.gov.
1' Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §1103, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
132 Id.
1 See Dispute Settlement: DS 267, supra note 116.
14 Mark Lange, National
Cotton Council, Brazil Cotton Case and the WTO (2005),
http://www.cotton.org/issues/2005/langereptica.cfn.
1s See RANDY SCHNEPF, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESPONSE TO
WTO CoTToN DECISION (Sep. 8, 2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/75266.pdf.
136 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, United States-Subsidies on Upland
130

Cotton, WT/DS267/30 (Aug. 21, 2006).

Brazil to Ask for WTO Cotton Compliance Panel in September, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 18,
2006, at 33.
138 Dispute Settlement DS 267, supra note 116.
" See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 118, at 5.
'4 See id. at 5.
141 See id. at 6.
1'
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subsidies granted under the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program
(GSM-102) issued after July 2005, circumvented U.S. export subsidy
commitments, violating Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 14 2 The export
subsidies supported unscheduled products and provided above-commitment-level
support to scheduled products, thereby violating Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the
SCM Agreement and the earlier DSB ruling. Both parties appealed the
decision.14 3 The Appellate Body's report of June 2, 2008 upheld the compliance
panel's finding that the GSM 102 export credit guarantees issued after July 1,
2005 constituted an "export subsidy" 1" and that the effect of the marketing loan
and counter-cyclical payments provided to upland cotton producers resulted in
significant price suppression, causing "present" serious prejudice to Brazil's
interests. 14 5 The Appellate Body also found that the United States had failed to
comply with the DSB's recommendations to remove the adverse effects of the
subsidy. 146
In August 2008, Brazil requested resumption of a previously
discontinued arbitration proceeding that had originally commenced in response to
the lack of implementation by the U.S. with respect to the requirements of the
first report from July 2005. A second arbitration proceeding was commenced
when Brazil requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations
under Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU, when the
reasonable period of time to rectify issues relating to actionable subsidies expired
in September 2005. Both these arbitration proceedings had been originally
stalled pending the second panel report on the question of non-compliance by the
U.S. In October 2008, both countries replaced arbitrators, further slowing the
course of events.14 7 With damage continuing to be done, Brazil pressured the
U.S. government to at least modify its programs; the U.S. did not budge.14 8 Far
from ending its damaging programs, the U.S. continued its attempts to scale back
commitments made under applicable rules concerning subsidies for agriculture,
while also continuing to seek greater concessions from WTO members so as to
increase its market access.14 9
Finally, the arbitration decision that was rendered on August 31, 2009,
considered three issues. 5 o First, with respect to the Step 2 program, Brazil's

142

See id. at 3.

143 See

id. at 4.
'" See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 118 (holding that the subsidies were
prohibited as export subsidies because the guarantee was extended for a premium that would be
inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the GSM- 102 program).
145 Id. At its meeting on June 20, 2008, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report.
146 Id.
47

Dispute Settlement: DS 267, supra note 116.

48 id.

See Porterfield,supra note 100, at 1000.
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States, United States-Subsidies On Upland Cotton
WT/DS267/ARB/1 3.3 (Aug. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Upland Arbitration] (highlighting that the
compliance panel also did not make any findings on the Step 2 measures).
149

150
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request for a "one-time" countermeasure (to the tune of $350 million) for the
failure of the U.S. to withdraw the subsidies between July 1, 2005 and July 31,
2006 was denied considering that the Step 2 program was terminated (as of
August 2006)."' Countermeasures were defined as a temporary remedy
available to induce compliance, with full implementation being preferable to the
suspension of concessions or other obligations.152
Second, Brazil sought permission to impose countermeasures pursuant to
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement for the U.S. export subsidy programs (GSM102, GSM-103, and SCGP) at an amount equivalent to the total exports for the
most recently concluded fiscal year.153 After considering a variety of factors
impacting the trade of the complaining member, the arbitrators authorized a
countermeasure1s4 and agreed to Brazil's request for an annually varying

countermeasure based on trade displaced, to be determined using a well-defined,
predictable formula.155
Third, with respect to prohibited subsidies, Brazil felt that it neither
practicable nor effective to suspend concessions only on imports of U.S. goods as
a countermeasure.' 5 6 Since the circumstances were serious enough to justify the
suspension of concession or obligations under other covered agreements, Brazil
proposed suspension of obligations under GATT 1994, GATS, and the
TRIPS Agreement. 5 7
The arbitrators determined that Brazil was unable to demonstrate that it
is not practicable to suspend concessions or other obligations in trade in goods
alone based on the level of trade displaced in the fiscal year 2006 and Brazil's
imports of consumer goods in the year 2007."5 Should the level of Brazil's

151Id.
152 Id.

at 4.42 (opining that such a definition is consistent with public international law definitions
as reflected in the International Labour Conventions Articles ("ILC") on State Responsibility).
15 In that request, Brazil estimated the value of this amount, together with the amount for Step 2
payment, at a total of three billion U.S. dollars, using fiscal year 2004 as reference. Id. at 4.1.
154 Id. at 4.278; see also id. at Annex 3 for detailed calculations. The arbitrators considered a
variety of factors including the prohibited nature of the subsidy and failure to withdraw the subsidy.
Brazil requested a countermeasure approximating U.S. S1.22 billion, but the arbitrators authorized
a total of U.S. $147.4 million.
1ss Id. at 4.278; see also id. at Annex 4 for the formula to calculate annual countermeasures. Brazil
demonstrated the U.S. GSM-supported exports displaced domestic production as well as thirdcountry exports. Termed as "additionality," Brazil estimated the additional export sales obtained
by U.S. exporters as a result of these discounts (reflecting a measure of the market volume loss to
other producers and exporters). Id.
'5 6 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 118, at 51-52.
157 See id. at 5.1.
'" Id. at 5.201. Brazil was required to follow the principles under Article 22.3 of the DSU in
determining that it was not practicable or effective to seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations in trade in goods alone and that the circumstances were serious enough. Given the
volume and composition of Brazil's imports of consumer goods in the year 2007, the arbitrators
determined that there was at least U.S. $409.7 million worth of Brazil's imports of consumer goods
from the United States that could be the subject of countermeasures (or "threshold"). Id.
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countermeasures entitlement increase in a given year,'59 the arbitrators were
willing to conclude that suspension of concessions or obligations applied to trade
in goods alone would not be "practicable or effective" within the meaning of
Article 22.3(c) of the DSU with respect to any amount of permissible
countermeasures applied in excess of the threshold identified.160 That is, the
arbitration decision left the possibility of suspending concessions or obligations
in trade, in services or in intellectual property rights provided a member state is
able to demonstrate that it is not practicable to suspend trade in goods alone.
However, Brazil was not allowed at that time to impose countermeasures as it
was unable to make such a demonstration.
In the following months, however, a change in trade volume between the
two parties pushed Brazil over the threshold, leading it to seek permission to
suspend certain trade obligations with respect to the U.S. On November 6, 2009,
Brazil formally requested the DSB to authorize retaliation under Article 22.7 of
the DSU per the Arbitrators' Decisions.16 ' When the DSB granted Brazil's
request on December 19, 2009, Brazil increased the levy of import duties on
certain products from the United States, effective April 7, 2010.162 Further,
Brazil notified the DSB that it intended to suspend concessions resulting in lifting
the intellectual property protections established under TRIPS and/or GATS on
$829 million worth of U.S. goods. 63
But retaliatory action was postponed while the parties attempted to reach
a mutually agreeable settlement. On April 21, 2010, the parties announced the
conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding under which Brazil agreed to
hold off on the authorized countermeasures for at least sixty days in return for a
U.S. package of support designed to aid Brazil's upland cotton farmers.'6 The
agreement established a fund amounting to $147.3 million per annum on a prorata basis, designated to provide technical assistance.6 s The fund will continue
until either the passage of the next Farm Bill or the establishment of a mutually
negotiated solution. 66 On June 17, 2010, just a few days before the expiration of
the negotiated sixty-day grace period, Brazil accepted a Framework proposed by

9
"s Id. The countermeasure entitlement-termed as "threshold"-amounting to U.S. $409.7 million
worth of Brazil's imports of consumer goods from the United States, takes into account the volume
and composition of Brazil's imports of consumer goods in the year 2007.
16o Id. at 6.5; see also id. at 5.230-5.236.
161 See The World Trade Organization, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Summary
of
the Dispute to Date, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu~e/casese/ds267e.htm (last visited
Aug. 8, 2010).

162

id

Id. See also Raymond Colitt & JoAnne Allen, UPDATE 1-Brazil suspends retaliation after US
concession, REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2013181920100421.
16 See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree on
Memorandum of Understanding as Part of Path Forward Toward Resolution of Cotton Dispute
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressat
available
21,
2010),
(April
releases/201 0/aprillus-brazil-agree-memorandum-understanding-part-path-f.
165 See Colitt & Allen, supra note 163.
'" Id.
163
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the U.S. and agreed to refrain from taking retaliatory measures.167 Through the
Framework, the United States promised to provide a platform for negotiating the
dispute and promised to limit trade-distorting cotton subsidies and to make
adjustments to its damaging GSM-102 program.168 The Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative has made clear, however, that the issue is far from resolved:
"[t]he Framework is still not a permanent solution to the Cotton dispute but is
merely an interim step for continued discussions on the programs to reach a
solution." 69
III. THE IMPLICATIONS
This section examines the DSU's decisions and demonstrates that the
is
normative in its approach. The section highlights how the strict
body
constructionist interpretation of the WTO agreements by the DSB has set harmful
precedents resulting in three distinct effects, namely: (1) reducing the line
between domestic issues and market access issues; (2) failing to balance the
rights and obligations of members; and (3) allowing powerful nations to avoid
WTO rules by simply not adopting them at the national level and thus preserving
bargaining imbalances.
Implication 1: DSB decisions have reduced the line between domestic issues
and market access issues
The WTO agreements distinguish between domestic regulation and
market access restrictions. 170 The agreements prohibit members from creating
market access restrictions that discriminate unfairly against imports, but provide
extensive regulatory autonomy as far as domestic regulations are concerned."'7
Article 2 of the Agreement establishing the WTO agreement clarifies the
demarcation by stating that the "WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters
related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the
Annexes to this Agreement." 7 2
Unfortunately, the demarcation standards between domestic regulation
and market access restrictions remains unclear, especially in questions relating to
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enforcement of the agreements. That is, in any given dispute, the DSB's sole
responsibility is merely to determine whether a market access restriction exists in
the member state in question.'" While general wisdom favors removal of all
market access restrictions, justifiable exceptions can be found in almost any
country for several reasons, including political, social, and/or market-oriented
ones. Further, a blanket recommendation from the DSB to remove the market
access restriction without fully appreciating the broader national, regional, or
even global effects of such removal would be myopic.
Additionally, unlike the limited role of the DSB, member governments
have a larger task to accomplish as far as national markets are concerned. Trade
regulations are only one part of the paradigm for national governments. Member
governments' resources (which can presumably be used for removing a market
access restriction) are limited in the sense that they demand allocation toward
conflicting or directly competing goals. For instance, should a country prioritize
providing patent protection to allow foreign investment in the future, or should it
take care of an existing public health crisis by providing generic drugs?
Deference has traditionally been given to states to act as they see fit on issues
that go to the political and social heart of a state's sovereignty, like health care
issues.17 4 In acknowledgement of this established approach, the WTO treaty
envisages latitude for states to act to address issues of a primarily national nature
precisely to give states the flexibility to act in light of the complex set of local
issues that each country faces-issues that can interfere with or impede trade
agreements. 7 5 All things considered, at a minimum the DSB should carefully
consider the likely effects of the removal or a market access restriction, weighing
it against the cost to international trade as well as to the member, before making
recommendations.
Instead, in determining whether a country has created a market access
restriction, the DSB has tended to interfere in domestic issues wholly outside the
scope of its original charge. A clear example is the DSB's opinion on whether
the legality of India's administrative orders interferes with India's sovereign right

173 See World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the
Settlement of Disputes arts. 3.3, 3.4, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/dsue.htm. The
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objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered
agreements." Id. art. 3.7. Thus, the DSU does not concern itself with the larger question of the
effect of a market access restriction on domestic issues. See also Marie-Christine Lebret & Arlene
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to choose the most appropriate legal tools for its domestic regulation.' 76 In this
case, the tools India chose provided for the requirements under the relevant
articles.177 That is, it is arguable that the Indian mailbox system, as it was then
instituted, was open to all patent applicants-foreign and domestic. All patent
applications were to be treated exactly the same, irrespective of nationality.
Further, the Indian government was willing to verify the legality of the tool.178
Given this, it is not the DSB's place to recommend a different legal
mechanism to establish the same system. The DSB, then, should have ended its
analysis upon a finding that India had, in fact, instituted a program that did
provide for priority of applications and would grant EMR if an applicant applied
for such status. 179 Instead, the DSB, in failing to defer to India's interpretation of
its own law, forced India to tailor an expensive, ill-fitting system that did not
cater to the country's interest.180 The system that India finally reluctantly
embraced resulted in the creation of a costly, incredibly unpopular program
designed to provide exclusive marketing rights. 8 1
The program's biggest disadvantage was the grant of EMR (which could
span up to five or more years approximately, based on several factors) to patent
applicants on the basis of patents issued elsewhere in the world, denying India
the right to determine patentability on its own terms. The DSB did not even
consider that when the EMR period expired, applications that are denied patent
protection would have enjoyed exclusive marketing rights up until that decision,
thereby carving out private rights from potentially public property. Nor did the
DSB weigh the cost with the benefit of establishing the recommended temporary
transition system. Clearly, establishing exclusive marketing rights based on
patents issued abroad should be a domestic sovereign decision that carefully
weighs the cost and benefits to the consumers in the light of local economic
conditions. In failing to consider local burdens and the potential effects of its
recommendation, the DSB opinion remains legally flawed. The mailbox
precedent thus highlights the dispute settlement body's intrusion into domestic
sovereign rights in order to establish market access on its own terms; terms that
have proven to be in conflict with both precedent and the common good.
The flaws in the opinions are perhaps owed to the DSB's
misconstruction of its charge under the DSU. The DSB is an arbiter of
international law and cannot act like a local national judicial body which
interprets statutes. While statutes may be construed strictly to give deference to
the legislature's views, normative interpretative techniques are rarely used to
International agreements memorialize
interpret international agreements.
collective sovereign intentions, and hence, are susceptible to realities on the
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ground, such as local needs, political conditions, and economic situations. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for instance, lends an objective-based
reading for international instruments precisely for the purpose of accommodating
flexibility.182 A more inclusive undertaking, of the sort required by Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention, for instance, would have required the DSB to appreciate
the broader aims of TRIPS outlined as Article 7's goal of creating mutually
advantageous relationships. 83 That is, a more sensible and traditional course of
interpretation would have required the body to examine TRIPS in the light of the
goals espoused in Article 7 as objectives along with the preamble's deference to
developing countries, and not in light of the text of Article 70.8.' Instead, the
appellate body's decision in the mailbox dispute preferred a strict-constructionist
and textualist approach to understanding the terms of the TRIPS agreement. The
decision lacuna in understanding ground realities perhaps resulted in events that
ultimately necessitated a clarification (to include flexibility) in the future, in the
form of the Doha Declaration.' 8 1
Implication 2: DSB decisions have upset the balance between rights and
obligations of parties
The balancing of rights and obligations remains integral to the WTO
framework. Such a balance is critical for members to perform trade-related
obligations without compromising other national welfare, socio-political
interests. Without this balance, there exists the danger of member states unduly
prioritizing trade interests to the detriment of worthy national issues.
Notably, even the preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
recognizes that member states should pursue trade and economic endeavors "in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development."1 86 The preamble recommends positive efforts to ensure
that poorer countries "secure a share in the growth in international trade"
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.' 87 Sensitivity to
local economic concerns is a right for which member states bargained and
acquired during the WTO negotiations in return for embracing the obligations
inherent in becoming a WTO member.
Furthermore, Article 7 of TRIPS, which highlights the objectives of the
agreement, likewise expresses the importance of balancing rights with

182 See Susy Frankel, The WTO's Application ofthe Customary Rules ofInterpretationof
Public InternationalLaw' to Intellectual Property,46 VIR. J. INT'L LAW 1, 14-17 (2005).
183 See supra note 7.
'8Id. at 19.
185 WTO Fourth Ministerial Conference, Declarationon TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at
Qatar,WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (01-5859) (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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obligations.'"
The article details that the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the twin objectives of promotion
of innovation and the transfer of technology, but makes clear that such objectives
are subject to three conditions: (1) conducting trade to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technology; (2) in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare; and (3) toward a balance of rights and obligations. 89
The DSB decisions have not reflected a sensitivity to maintain the
imminent balance outlined in the preamble and in Article 7 of TRIPS, which
reflect the intent of the parties to the WTO system.190 The outstanding question,
then, is what exactly are the tenets of the "balance" and how can its constituents
be determined? The reference to a balance in the preamble and in Article 7 of the
TRIPS agreement can be construed in a number of ways, as detailed below.' 9 '
The reference to balance in the WTO Agreement can be construed as a
reference to an internal balance-that is, any obligation that a member country
seeks to fulfill under TRIPS (or any other WTO agreement) must be balanced
with the rights of the members, meaning it should be commensurate with the
country's economic development. That is, costs incurred by members in
fulfilling an obligation, say TRIPS implementation, must be balanced against the
"rights" (the right to exercise the obligation flexibly) afforded under the treaty.
Put differently, the detriment to a state from a WTO obligation should be roughly
in line with the benefit it receives-a mere promise of trade and investment in the
future does not constitute a "benefit"-and it should not be unduly burdensome
given the economic status of the member.
Such a reading would require the dispute settlement mechanism to give
greater deference to members' national priorities in light of their obligations,
which the DSU clearly failed to do in the mailbox dispute. In determining
India's compliance, the potential costs and benefits for the member nations were
not given due consideration. The country's sovereign right to construct and
implement a scheme that would bring it into compliance with TRIPS was
ignored. The mailbox decision swung the pendulum toward obligations and
disturbingly away from the rights of the member state.
Alternately, the balance referred to in the preamble and in Article 7 of
TRIPS can be construed as an overall balance. That is, a balance between the
various rights and obligations members have chosen to embrace. For example,
some scholars contend that the developing states sought concessions on other
matters (such as textiles and agriculture) and agreed to TRIPS obligations on
intellectual property rights with the understanding that it would indeed harm
them in that regard, but saw it as the consideration they must pay for those
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concessions.192 That is, the "balance" referred to in Article 7 could mean that any
damage done to the poor nations under TRIPS is automatically balanced by gains
from concessions in other areas, such as textiles and agriculture.
If that was the case, the DSB in the mailbox dispute should have taken
cognizance of the cross-obligations. The DSB should have read the ambiguities
in Article 70 (8) and (9) in favor of resolving obligations of parties in comparable
timelines. The DSB could have sought a commitment from India to fully
implement TRIPS at the end of the transitional period, subject to the pending
resolution on agriculture. Indeed, the transitional period for the TRIPS
agreement and the Peace Clause on the agreement on agriculture expired around
the same period.' 93 Instead, the opinion of the DSB forced developing countries
to fulfill international obligations at the cost of national issues while not forcing
reciprocity from the developed countries.
Lastly, the balance struck in Article 7 could be construed as a global
balance-that the obligations of members will be balanced by an increase in
global welfare.194 The issue then is whether the consideration of global welfare
provides an adequate "balance" for countries to fulfill their international
obligations, often to their own detriment. Would populations and their elected
leaders be willing to jeopardize their own national economic welfare in the quest
for global economic welfare (the sum of the welfare effects on all nations)? This
seems unlikely, leading to the conclusion that this is not at all what the
developing states had in mind when signing on to the agreement. Moreover, in
international agreements, sovereigns typically represent the sentiments of their
citizens. It is a fantasy to assume that citizens of developing nations would
choose obligations that result in immediate life-affecting losses (like loss of
access to medication) in favor of a greater global benefit.
Further, there appears to be a distinct lack of economic justification in
expecting poor nations to vote for global welfare at the cost of national welfare.
Free trade, the central aim of TRIPS, is well couched on Adam Smith's
observations that "what is prudence in the conduct of every private family can
scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom." 95 Accordingly, what is prudence in
the context of national economics cannot be a folly in the context of international
The world is comprised of more developing than developed
economics.
nations.' 96 Economically there seems to be no logic in arguing that the national
welfare of some 136 developing nations can be compromised to lead to a
"global" welfare, the benefits of which will be reflected in a mere handful of
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nations. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the "balance of rights" in the
preamble is a reference to global welfare. In order to achieve the objectives of
the WTO agreements, it is imperative that DSB decisions takes into consideration
the envisaged and critical balance between rights and obligations of members.
Implication 3: The DSB allows powerful nations to avoid WTO rules by
simply not adopting them at the national level and thus serves to preserve
bargaining imbalances
While the DSB takes a normative approach in interpreting the WTO
agreements, the body is seemingly unable to achieve the agreements' objectives
with powerful countries that are unwilling to comply with the DSB's decisions.
To that extent, the failure of the DSB is the exact opposite of the failures of the
earlier intellectual property law conventions. In the cases of the Paris and Berne
Conventions, more often that not, securing the compliance of the poorer
signatories to the international obligations was the difficult task.19 7 However, in
the case of the WTO agreements, the developing and least developed countries
either complied or have found legally viable options to seek exceptions (e.g.,
Doha Declaration).' 98 But, as the upland cotton dispute demonstrates, the
developed world has shown a propensity to renege on its international
obligations.
Unfortunately, when powerful nations renege on their obligations, the
body seems indecisive, powerless and lacking in appropriate implementation
tools. The DSB system is designed to punish non-compliant poor nations by
authorizing trade sanctions but seems to lack ammunition to enforce agreements
or decisions where rich nations are unwilling to comply. For instance, in the
upland cotton dispute, the panel refused to act decisively on Brazil's claims
regarding non-compliance.9 Had the panel deciding the compliance issue
originally granted Brazil permission to impose countermeasures and/or levy
cross-sanctions (by suspending intellectual property rights), it would have set the
tone for compliance by all members. Perhaps the U.S. would have been forced to
change at least the most odious of its amber box subsidies at a much earlier time,
thereby reducing the damage it caused to world cotton prices. By letting the U.S.
drag its feet with only the excuse of the domestic political process for not
complying with the appellate body's report, the DSB was disappointingly
ineffective with a powerful non-complying party. Brazil had to take the longdrawn and expensive route of seeking arbitration in order to achieve its end.200
Nearly eight years after Brazil first formally voiced its concerns with the WTO,
whether the matter will ever be adequately put to rest remains unclear. Such
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failures of the DSB to act decisively allow powerful nations to avoid the rules of
the WTO by simply refusing to take adequate actions, offering only the excuse of
the domestic political process.
As mentioned earlier, developing country members of the WTO act on a
DSB ruling when a national law or program is inconsistent with a WTO
agreement to avoid trade sanctions (the enactment of the patent amendments in
India being an example). The U.S. Congress, instead, adopted the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, limiting the reach of the WTO mechanism into its
domestic matters. 2 01 The DSB, which ruled on the legality of India's internal
legal systems, did very little to secure compliance from the United States.
The DSB could have approached the issue from a less normative and a
more objective perspective from the outset in interpreting the agreements in
question in the upland cotton dispute. Such a reading would have showcased the
objective of the WTO system in light of the bargains made by the parties and the
overall objectives of the system and paved the way for compliance by more
powerful countries.
Consequently, the DSB mechanism has frustrated poorer nations,
affecting their ability to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
effectively. 202 Decisions like the upland cotton dispute that showcase the
vulnerability of the DSB serve to increase the developing nations' lack of
confidence in the body and leave them unable to fully exploit the DSB system to
their rightful benefit. 203 Notably, failures of the DSB to provide the same level of
treatment have in turn helped preserve the bargaining inequalities between rich
and poor states, as discussed below. That is, the panel's failure to act, pursuant
to Article 22.3 of the DSU, and to swiftly order the U.S. to either compensate
Brazil or authorize retaliation, has in effect left Brazil without a solution. 20
While the Framework it recently agreed to with the U.S. may be a step in the
right direction, it comes much too late and the U.S. itself has acknowledged that
the conflict is not yet settled. The affair leaves the impression that a developed
country was allowed to circumvent the rules and manipulate world cotton trade.
Clearly, the upland cotton dispute highlights the detriment to developing
countries like Brazil resulting from the inherent bargaining inequity of the
system. An enforcement mechanism that fails to expeditiously and thoroughly
enforce its rulings clearly benefits the rich.
If the tables were reversed and Brazil had been the victor and the U.S.
the loser, the U.S. would simply have relied on its economic superiority and
forced Brazil into compliance through non-WTO channels. Instead, Brazil has
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been unable, despite its strongest protestations and political maneuvering, to
bring the U.S. anywhere close to full compliance. While negotiations have been
for the most part in vain, the U.S. has continued to maintain the economic and
political clout to do next to nothing for the better part of a decade. For weaker
states, the WTO is the only forum in which they have a legitimate chance of
edging the rich.
By not timely authorizing retaliation or ordering the U.S. to pay, the
DSB has taken away one of the few advantages the developing world thought it
had gained under the WTO-an objective enforcement mechanism that took no
account of wealth or status and would vindicate those who had been harmed in
contravention of WTO law. Instead, the functioning of the DSB has only served
to preserve the maladies of status quo. That is, the inability of the DSB to
enforce compliance from powerful states has contributed to the preservation of
already-existing bargaining balances. It has taken away the one tool the
developing states had hoped would shape a more just world order.
As with the mailbox dispute, a more inclusive consideration of all
relevant circumstances would have served the WTO well in the upland cotton
dispute. In recognizing the dire position of the developing world in an industry
as important as that of cotton, and in acknowledging that short of the help of the
WTO the developing states will not be able to force compliance by the rich, the
DSB would better serve the goal of the trading system. In the future, the DSB
should give due consideration to the fact that rich states will avoid the rules by
simply not passing their own domestic laws that would ensure compliance, and it
should be conscious of the fact that inaction preserves and ratifies bargaining
imbalances. This will inform the DSB's approach to disputes and, in cases like
the upland cotton dispute, inspire quick and thorough action to enforce its
rulings. This approach would level the playing field, bringing the WTO closer to
the utilitarian system envisioned by its founders and the overwhelming majority
of its members.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DSU's lack of any explicit requirement to consider local social and
economic conditions in determining compliance under WTO agreements and the
DSB's failure to glean such an obligation from relevant texts and apply it
accordingly have severely damaged developing states. By interpreting the
normative DSU in a way that fails to account for local realities and disregards the
broader aims of the trading regime, and by failing to take quick action to
thoroughly enforce its rulings, the DSB has proved incapable of achieving the
utilitarian objectives of the WTO system. The case studies discussed above are
representative of the problems caused by the current operation of dispute
settlement under the DSU. The DSB's neglect of consideration of issues beyond
the text of the WTO agreements has not served the goals of the trading regime.

